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Abstract
In a tournament, a principal sets a prize, and several agents then compete to
attain the highest observed output, and win the prize. This paper departs from
the existing literature on tournaments by assuming that agents can influence the
spread of their distribution of output, in addition to the mean. We ask in which way
risk taking and eﬀort interacts in equilibrium. First, under standard tournament
rewards, the unique equilibrium will have a low level of eﬀort and a high level of risk
taking. Second, by modifying the tournament scheme to give the prize to the agent
with the ’most moderate’ output, a high level of eﬀort can be implemented. We
argue that the first result can be useful to understand the RPE puzzle of executive
compensation, and the second result can be useful to understand puzzling workplace
norms promoting mediocrity.
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1 Introduction
To the extent that real-world rewards are based on measures of performance, they often
depend on relative performance. For example, promotion is awarded to the most pro-
ductive member of a level in an organization; the CEO of the least profitable firm in an
industry gets fired, and the mutual fund with the highest return one year gets a higher
investor inflow the next year.
The main theoretical rationale for rewarding relative performance stems from the In-
formativeness Principle (Holmstrom, 1982), which, informally, states that an optimal com-
pensation contract conditions rewards on any variable that is (incrementally) informative
about work intensity (eﬀort). Recently, a corollary of the Informativeness Principle known
as the relative performance evaluation (RPE) hypothesis has been extensively tested in
the large empirical literature on CEO compensation (see Murphy, 1999, or Prendergast,
1998, for overviews). The idea behind the RPE hypothesis is that if firms in the same
industry face some common random shock, like changes in industry demand, an optimal
compensation contract for a CEO makes his payment conditional on the relative perfor-
mance of the firm (in addition to its absolute performance); the higher the profit of the
other firms, the lower the reward of the CEO. In the empirical literature, researchers
tend to be puzzled by the lack of evidence for RPE in the CEO compensation data. For
example, Aggarwal & Samwick (1999a) ’suggest that relative performance evaluation con-
siderations are not incorporated into executive compensation contracts’ (p. 104, ibid.).
And, Murphy (1999, page 40) states that: ’The paucity of RPE in options and other
components of executive compensation remains a puzzle worth understanding’.
A seemingly unrelated puzzle to the RPE Puzzle is the ’Mediocrity Puzzle’; sometimes
there are stronger incentives for delivering a mediocre performance than for a higher per-
formance. The mechanism underlying such non-monotonic rewards is sometimes informal,
through peer pressure, and sometimes formal, through explicit working contracts. For peer
pressure towards mediocrity, Levine (1992) reports of several illustrating cases. For exam-
ple, Frederick Taylor, the creator of Scientific Management, was threatened with shooting
by his co-workers for being too productive and ’innovative’. And Mui (1995) reports of
a well-publicized case in China where a successful village entrepreneur was haunted by
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several ’misfortunes’ after becoming rich; the timber of his house were stolen, a pregnant
cow was stabbed to death, several other animals were poisoned. There are also examples
where formal rewards work in favor of mediocrity. For example, fund manager compensa-
tion schemes sometimes have an outlier eﬀect: a very low return and a very high return
yields a lower reward from the principal than performances in the middle.1
The purpose of the paper is to provide explanations of the RPE Puzzle and of the
Mediocrity Puzzle, based on the concepts of tournaments and risk taking. In a tour-
nament, a principal sets a prize, and several agents then compete to attain the highest
observed output, and win the prize. The paper departs from the existing literature on
tournaments by assuming that agents can influence the spread of distribution of output,
e.g., through the choice of projects, and the project mean through the choice of eﬀort. For
example, CEOs can choose whether the firm should pursue a safe or a risky R&D profile,
and a variety of other decisions that also aﬀects the risk profile of a firm (e.g., which type
of workers to employ, whether to enter emerging markets or not), in addition to deciding
how hard to work. And fund managers can choose the riskiness of their portfolio, in
addition to choosing how much resources to spend on providing and analyzing relevant
stock information.2
Intuitively, there are two types of combinations of risk and eﬀort that are consistent
with equilibrium. If the equilibrium risk taking is high, then the marginal increase in the
probability of winning from increasing eﬀort is low, and equilibrium eﬀort must be low.
And conversely, if the equilibrium risk taking is low, then the equilibrium eﬀort is high,
since the marginal increase in the probability of winning from increasing eﬀort is high.
Hence for a given prize structure, equilibrium must either have a high level of risk and a
low eﬀort level, or a low level of risk and a high level of eﬀort. Notice, however, that is
not obvious which of these configurations will be consistent with equilibrium, since both
risk taking and eﬀort are treated as endogenous variables.
1To illustrate this point, Skandia Fund Managment (SFM), which manages approximately $50 billion
in the Scandinavian Market, first selects an initial pool of fund managers, and then gradually terminates
the relationship with the managers whose return are too high or too low compared to an index return.
SFM engages in a long(er) term relationship with the remaining managers. I am grateful to the CEO of
SFM, Harald Troye, for providing this information.
2Other examples include employees aspiring for promotion or tenure.
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In Proposition 1, it is shown that with no limits to possible risk taking, agents exert
zero eﬀort and choose an infinite risk in equilibrium. Since the expected production is zero
in this case, the tournament breaks down as a reward scheme. This result is somewhat
modified in Proposition 2, where possible risk taking is limited, but still the moral hazard
problem is grave. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 together indicate that a reason why
CEO compensation to a small extent depends on the relative performance of the firm
is that putting weight to the rank of the CEO in the industry may induce a manager
preference for risky projects, that moreover are not properly cared for.
Given this negative result, we ask whether the tournament reward scheme can be
modified to avoid the risky-lazy ’trap’ of the standard tournament. To this end, a scheme
where agents are ranked according to the relative closeness of their output to a benchmark
k is considered. The idea behind this scheme, labeled k-contracts, is that excessive risk
can be avoided, which in turn can provide incentives for working hard.
The second main result, Proposition 3, states that there exists intermediate values
of the benchmark k such that first best level of eﬀort can be implemented under risk
neutrality. The empirical value of Proposition 3 is that it sheds light on why sometimes
higher rewards are given to agents with a modest performance than to agents with a
very high performance. A norm that gives the highest informal status to agents that
have a moderately high relative performance can be more eﬃcient than a norm that gives
highest informal status to agents with the highest relative status. Or, a fund management
company that wants to reward their fund managers according to their relative output to
e.g., protect the managers against common risk factors, may consider to give the highest
reward to the manager with a portfolio return that comes closest to some benchmark or
index, rather than giving the highest reward to the manager with the highest portfolio
return.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, related literature is discussed.
Section 2 sets up the model and contains the analysis, while Section 3 concludes. Some
of the proofs are relegated to appendices A and B.
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1.1 Related literature
As outlined by e.g., Lazear (1995, 1999), tournament theory is one of the cornerstones of
personell economics. While there is a growing empirical literature on tournaments (Ehren-
berg and Bognanno, 1990, Brown et al. 1996, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, and Eriksson,
1999), this literature is limited to overview the theoretical literature on tournaments,
before it briefly discusses received explanations of the RPE Puzzle and the Mediocrity
Puzzle.
Tournaments were first studied by the classic Lazear & Rosen (1981), who in a model
with eﬀort as the only choice variable showed that individualistic schemes and tournament
schemes under certain conditions are equivalent. Later contributions to the ’eﬀort’ strand
of the tournament literature includes Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) on correlated output,
Rosen (1988) on knock-out tournaments, Clark and Riis (1998) and Moldovanu and Sela
(2000) on the case with multiple prizes, and Fullerton and McAﬀee (1999) on tournaments
with a fee for entering. On the other hand, tournaments with risk taking as the only choice
variable was first considered by Bronars (1987), who studied the diﬀerences for incentives
to take risk between leaders and followers in sequential tournaments. Other papers in the
risk taking strand of the literature include Cabral (1997), on the endogenous choice of
covariance, Dekel & Scotchmer (1999) on tail dominance, and Hvide & Kristiansen (1999)
on the selection properties of tournaments.
Importantly, while the received literature on tournaments consider eﬀort or risk taking
as choice variables for the agents, the present paper considers the interaction between
eﬀort and risk taking. By including both variables we can highlight how the equilibrium
choice of eﬀort depends on the equilibrium choice of risk taking, and vice versa, a topic
that has not been treated before by the literature.3
On the RPE Puzzle, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) argue that the RPE eﬀect on
compensation schemes can be neutralized by a delegation eﬀect stemming from imperfect
competition in the product markets. However, their delegation argument is ambiguous; if
Cournot competition, rather than Bertrand competition, prevails in the product markets,
their model strengthens the prediction of RPE hypothesis. In contrast, we point out
3This also holds true of the (non-tournament) agency literature, with the exception of Diamond (1998).
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harmful eﬀects of RPE in compensation schemes also even when product markets are
competitive.4
On the Mediocrity Puzzle, Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) derives an optimal reward
scheme for fund managers, where managers with a ’too’ high return will be replaced.
However, this result refers to the solution of an adverse selection problem, while the scheme
proposed in the present paper solves an unrelated moral hazard problem. Moreover, there
is no notion of risk taking in the model of Heinkel and Stoughton (1994). Gibbons (1987)
argue that piece rate schemes are necessarily non-monotonic, when taking into account
dynamic eﬀects; a high performance will indicate to the principal that the job is simple,
and hence that a less lucrative piece rate is suﬃcient to keep the worker in the firm.
However, since Gibbons (1987) considers environments where the payoﬀ of an agent is
independent of the productivity of other agents, it is mute on the link between relative
performance and non-monotonic rewards, and hence unable to explain the Mediocrity
Puzzle, where relative performance is an essential ingredient. Levine (1992), building
on Jones (1984), argues that a norm to punish ’ratebusters’ may be eﬃcient for the
workgroup, from the same type of argument as in Gibbons (1987). However, since the
firm realizes a low level of profit under this norm, the overall level of welfare is suboptimal,
and it is therefore not clear why a norm for mediocrity should survive in their setting. In
contrast, we show that a norm for mediocrity can realize high levels of overall welfare.
2 Analysis
Section 2.1. sets up a standard tournament model with eﬀort as the only choice variable;
Section 2.2 adds a notion of risk taking to that model, and Section 2.3 introduces k-
contracts.
4An older argument against RPE is that compensation schemes that put too much weight on relative
performance are sensitive to collusion between the agents that are compared. For illustration, if the sum
of compensation for two workers is constant, then both workers would be better oﬀ if they could collude in
slacking their eﬀort. However, since collusion typically requires a long-term relationship, such arguments
seems more applicable to explain lack of intra-firm RPE than lack of inter-firm RPE.
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2.1 The Tournament Model
In this section we review the standard tournament model of Lazear and Rosen (1981).
There is one risk-neutral principal and several risk neutral agents, for convenience assumed
to be only two.5 The value of agent i’s output equals Yi = µi + εi, where µi is agent i’s
choice of eﬀort, and where εi is an iid shock with E(εi) = 0 and E(ε2i ) = σ
2. Yi and Yj
are the only contractible variables. The cost of eﬀort is symmetric, Vi(µi) = Vj(µj), and
Vi(µi) is assumed to satisfy Vi(0) = Vi’(0) = 0, and Vi’, Vi” > 0 for µi > 0. The first-best
level of eﬀort, denoted µ∗i , is the µi that solves V ’(µi) = 1. The cost of eﬀort is symmetric,
with V1(..) = V2(..) = V (..). For clarity of exposition, we deviate from Lazear and Rosen
(1981) by considering the special case when εi is normally distributed.
Under a rank-order scheme, the principal fixes the prizesW1 andW2 [whereW1 > W2],
and the agents then compete in winning the first prizeW1, which is awarded to the agent
with the highest Yi. Expected utility for agent i, Ui, equals,
Ui = PiW1 + (1− Pi)W2 − V (µi) = Pi∆W +W2 − V (µi) (1)
where ∆W = W1 −W2, and Pi = Prob(Yi > Yj) = Prob(µi − µj > εj − εi). For agent 1
we get, P1 = Prob(Y1 > Y2) = Prob(µi − µj > ε) = G(µ1 − µ2), where G(..) is the cdf of
ε [ε ≡ ε2− ε1]. Clearly ε is normally distributed with E(ε) = 0 and E(ε2) = 2σ2. The
first order condition for optimal provision of eﬀort becomes,
∂Ui
∂µi
=
∂Pi
∂µi
∆W − ∂V
∂µi
= 0, i = 1, 2. (2)
Notice that due to the option-like structure of the prizes, only the diﬀerence between the
first and the second prize, ∆W , enters the first order conditions. By symmetry, if there
exists an equilibrium, then in equilibrium µ1 = µ2, and the outcome is purely random,
i.e., P = 1
2
, since G(0) = 1
2
. By substituting µ1 = µ2 in (2), equilibrium eﬀort, µ
∗
i , can be
5All results can easily be generalized to hold for an arbitrary number of agents.
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characterized by,
∂V
∂µi
= ∆Wg(0), i = 1, 2. (3)
Inserting for the normal density,
∂V
∂µi
=
∆W
2
√
σ2π
, i = 1, 2 (4)
From inspecting (4), it can easily be seen that µ∗i is implementable with an appropriate
choice of ∆W . Since ∆W can be made independent of the total outlays, W1 +W2, the
positive implementation result is consistent with zero profits. Notice also that it follows
from (4) that the equilibrium eﬀort is decreasing in σ. Intuitively, a higher σ makes the
outcome of the tournament more noisy, which decreases the marginal gain of increasing
eﬀort, and hence reduces equilibrium eﬀort.
2.2 Risk Taking in the Tournament Model
By ’increasing risk’ it is meant that the agent induces a mean-preserving spread of Yi,
through increasing the variance of εi. The way the agent induces this spread may either
be through his choice of projects or through manipulating the principal’s measurement
error of Yi. In particular, the assumptions of the previous section are adhered to, except
that the shock εi is now an endogenous variable. The variance of εi equals η2i , where η
2
i =
σ2 + s2i , with σ > 0 and si ∈ <+. The interpretation of σ is the level of non-diversifiable,
background, noise, and si is the degree of voluntary spread in the output distribution.
Thus si is a choice variable for agent i, while σ is, as before, a parameter. The cost of
adjusting si is assumed to be uniformly zero. As before, output is assumed to be the only
contractible variable.
Notice that risk taking added to the agents’ choice set in this manner has the con-
venient property that increased risk has no direct eﬀect either on utility or on profits
(expected output), first best levels of eﬀort is identical to in the previous section.6 Al-
6We are well aware of cases where it can be diﬃcult to separate the expectation of Yi and its variance.
For example, in the classic CAPM model of financial asset pricing, a portfolio with a higher risk will also
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though there is no direct link between risk taking and welfare, the following result shows
that the indirect eﬀect can be dramatic.
Proposition 1 The unique equilibrium induces infinite variance and zero eﬀort from both
agents.
Proof. We first show that X∗ = {si = sj = ∞ and µi = µj = 0} is a Nash
Equilibrium, and then show uniqueness. Suppose µi = 0 and si =∞. Then agent j wins
with probability
1
2
irrespectively of his choice of µj and sj . Therefore, µj = 0 and sj =∞
is a best reply to µi = 0 and si = ∞ , and hence X∗ is a NE. To prove that X∗ is a
unique NE, first consider tuples with (i)µi < µj . For (i) to be a Nash equilibrium, clearly
si = ∞, since that choice of si maximizes Pi. That implies µi = 0. But, in that case,
µj = 0 is a best reply from agent j, which contradicts (i). So in any Nash equilibrium
we have that µi = µj . Tuples with (ii)µi = µj > 0 are now excluded. If µi = µj then
P = 1/2. But since both players have positive cost of eﬀort, player i can gain by changing
µi (one obvious improvement is to set µi = 0 and si = ∞). But then we are in case (i).
Hence neither (i) nor (ii) is consistent with Nash behavior, and X∗ is a unique NE.
Thus if agents can choose their level of risk taking, in addition to their eﬀort, a
tournament induces extremely risky and lazy behavior from workers. The intuition for
the result is that the agents have a common incentive to increase the level of noise in the
tournament, to thereby lessen the importance of diﬀerences in means (eﬀort) to the win
probability. And, in turn, when eﬀort becomes less detrimental to the win probability, the
agents have less incentive to expend eﬀort, which makes the equilibrium levels of eﬀort
more comfortable to them. It should be emphasized that the intuition for the result is not
that tournament rewards are convex in performance, which in turn gives incentives for an
extreme degree of risk taking. The reason why this intuition is false is that whether an
agent has incentives for risk taking or not depends on whether he exerts more eﬀort than
the other agents. If an agent exerts more eﬀort than the other agent, he has an incentive
to choose a low level of risk rather than a high level of risk. So this intuition does not
take into account that eﬀort is an endogenous variable.
generate a higher expected return. To treat such a case, we would need to have a risk averse principal,
which would harden the computations significantly.
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Proposition 1 contradicts the intuition of Lazear & Rosen (1981), which state: ”In
this paper the worker has no choice over [the variance of individual output]. This does
not aﬀect the risk neutral solution but does have an eﬀect if workers are risk averse, since
they tend to favor overly cautious strategies ... .” (footnote 1, page 843).7
Since Proposition 1 is obtained under rather special assumptions, let us discuss its
robustness. First notice that exactly the same argument, and the same negative result,
goes through if risk-averse agents play the tournament. Hence agents choose infinite
variance and zero eﬀort in equilibrium even if they are risk averse. In fact, the only
requirement for the result to go through is that U (..) is monotonic. This can be seen by
replacing ∆W by ∆U in equation (4), where ∆U ≡ U(W1) − U (W2). Second, although
normality of the shocks is convenient for illustration, weaker distributional assumptions
can be made. In Appendix A, we generalize Proposition 1 to hold for εi unimodal and
symmetric. Third, since lack of independence in the sense of a positively correlated shocks
is one of the main justifications for applying tournaments (see e.g., Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz
1983), it is worth noticing that Proposition 1 holds for any degree of correlation between
the shocks. Recall that for the normal distribution, the coeﬃcient of correlation, ρ, can
be determined independently of the variances. When the variances go to infinity, P goes
to 1/2 independently of µi and ρ. Hence Proposition 1 is robust to introducing risk averse
or risk loving preferences, and to having a more general stochastic structure.
However, since the meaning of ’infinite variance’ is somewhat unclear, it is useful to
consider the case where there are limits to risk taking. It is now assumed that si ∈
[smin, smax], ∀i, where 0 < smin < smax, with smax finite. Hence risk taking is bounded by
a lower limit smin and an upper limit smax. To avoid non-existence problems, we consider
the game where the agents first choose level of risk taking and then, after observing
each others choice of risk, decide how hard to work. We consider the subgame perfect
equilibrium of this two stage game.
Proposition 2 In the subgame perfect equilibrium, both agents choose si = smax in the
7Also Murphy (1999) seems to be overly optimistic with respect to the optimality properties of RPE
when the agent has additional choice variables to eﬀort (page 41, ibid.): ’RPE remains a strong prediction
of the model after expanding the managerial action set, since paying based on relative performance
provides essentially the same incentives as paying based on absolute performance, while insulating risk-
averse managers from common shocks.’
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first stage, and the corresponding low eﬀort in the second stage.
Proof. In equilibrium at stage 2, P =
1
2
independently of level of risk taken at stage
1. Since the equilibrium eﬀort is a decreasing function in the sum of s1 and s2, both
agents choose si = smax at stage 1, in dominant strategies. Since the equilibrium risk
taking at stage 1 is high, the equilibrium eﬀort at stage 2 is consequently low.
Proposition 2 shows that even when there are limits to risk taking, the moral hazard
problem induced by a tournament reward structure is serious: equilibrium behavior by
the agents is risky and lazy. As with Proposition 1, Proposition 2 can be generalized to a
situation with risk averse agents and a more general stochastic structure (see Appendix
A). Notice that a comparative statics exercise on smax yields a simple result; the equilib-
rium eﬀort is monotonically decreasing in smax. This can be interpreted as the greater
opportunity of taking risk, the less eﬃcient is a tournament reward structure.
However, it is true that given risk neutrality, first best can be implemented for any
finite smax, with an appropriate choice of∆W . Therefore, to make the eﬃciency argument
more clear, we need to move to risk averse agents. In the following, we compare the relative
eﬃciency of piece rates schemes and tournament schemes under risk aversion. Suppose
that the principal sets the piece rate, and that the agent then responds by choosing a
level of risk and a level of eﬀort. First notice that the eﬃciency of piece-rates schemes is
independent of smax, since the agents will choose si = smin in dominant strategies. This
is a consequence of the well-known fact that a risk-averse agent prefers a lower variance
to a higher variance, for a given coeﬃcient of the incentive scheme. On the other hand,
in tournaments with risk averse agents, an increase in smax implies that ∆W to induce
the same level of eﬀort. But then welfare of the agents is reduced, since the variability of
payment increases. The following remark follows
Remark 1 Under risk-aversion, the relative eﬃciency of tournaments versus piece-rates
is decreasing in smax.
Hence we have shown that under tournament rewards, the level of risk taking will be
high, and the equilibrium eﬀort will be high, compared to a situation where risk taking not
taken into consideration as a choice variable. Moreover, under risk aversion the relative
eﬃciency of tournaments versus piece rates is decreasing in the level of possible risk taking.
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An application of these results is that they shed light on the RPE Puzzle, why relative
performance evaluation is used less in CEO compensation than what standard agency
theory suggests. Specifically, if risk taking is a choice variable for a CEO then the principal
(e.g., the board) should be careful in conditioning rewards on the performance of other
CEO’s, since such schemes induce risky and lazy behavior from CEOs.
For example, one potentially important component of CEO pay is the use of relative
performance evaluation in annual bonus plans (Murphy, 1999). Such plans could specify
a bonus for the CEO if the performance of the firm exceeds that of the competitors.
Potentially, there is a gain in such plans, since it insulates the CEO for common risk
factors like market demand. For simplicity, assume that there are only two firms in the
industry, and that the annual bonus of the CEO can take two values; 0 if the firm has a
worse performance than the competitor (e.g., with respect to return on capital), and 1 if
the firm is more successful than the competitor. If the CEO of the competing firms also
have such a bonus package as an important ingredient of the compensation scheme, then
the CEOs in the industry can be viewed as competing in a tournament, where the winner
is the CEO whose performance is the highest. We can predict that in equilibrium, the
CEO will choose risky projects and work less ardently than if he would have chosen less
risky projects, since increasing the mean profit through hard work pays less. The board
can oﬀset this eﬀect by increasing the bonus size, but such a move would add risk to
the CEOs compensation, and reduce his welfare under managerial risk aversion. In view
this argument, the board should be cautious with conditioning the CEO compensation on
relative performance. And caution with basing pay on relative performance is exactly what
the findings behind the RPE Puzzle tell us is the case in real life executive compensation.
In general, when risk taking is an option, the choice of risk taking from an agent’s
standpoint will be a trade oﬀ between the reduced positive eﬀect of increasing risk on the
relative component of the compensation tournament (decreased eﬀort), and the negative
eﬀect of increasing risk on the absolute component of the compensation package (increased
variance of payment). With this trade oﬀ in mind, a conjecture is that if the CEO is risk
averse and faces a mixture of relative and absolute rewards, the optimal contract when
risk taking is an option relies less on relative factors than when risk taking is not a choice
variable. That would be the counterpart of our results to an optimal contract setting.
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Since little is known about optimal contracts even when the principal can only condition
payment on the agent’s own output, to prove this conjecture is unfortunately too diﬃcult
given the present state of the literature.
We now turn to discussing whether the tournament reward structure can be modified to
avoid the risky-lazy ’trap’ of standard tournaments. That will shed light on the Mediocrity
Puzzle.
2.3 Extension: k-contracts
The idea behind the contract form proposed in this section is that if agents are motivated
to achieve a moderately high output, instead of a very high output, they can get an
incentive to choose a moderate level of risk taking, which, in the next turn, can create
incentives to work hard.8
Consider a modified tournament reward structure, where the winner of the tournament
is the agent with output closest to a finite benchmark k. To avoid confusion with standard
tournaments, this modified tournament structure is labeled k-contracts.
The distance between k and agent i’s observed output, Di, equals,
Di = |Yi − k| (5)
Denote by Qi(..) agent i’s probability of having an observed output closer to k than agent
j, and hence win the tournament. Formally, Qi(..) = Prob(Di < Dj). The expected
utility for agent i under a k-contract then equals,
Ui = QiW1 + (1−Qi)W2 − V (µi) = Qi∆W +W2 − V (µi) (6)
The following remark clarifies the relation between k-contracts and standard tournaments.
Remark 2 If k =∞ the agents play a standard tournament game. If k <∞, the reward
8An criticism of non-monotonic schemes is that they give incentives to dispose with parts of the output
(if output falls in the non-monotonic range). However, since disposal is equivalent to theft, this criticism
applies to all compensation schemes with marginal reward less than marginal output, which gives the
agents incentives to steal the output. Contracts in practice prescribe punishment for theft (or ’disposal’),
if detected. Here, I simply assume that disposal is not a choice variable for the agents.
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to agent i is non-monotonic in own performance.
Proof. Recall that Pi(..) is the probability of agent i winning in the standard tourna-
ment case, where Pi = Prob(Yi − Yj > 0). We show that Qi(..) and Pi(..) converge when
k goes to infinity. By definition, Qi(..) = Prob(Di < Dj). Since Di > 0, we have that,
Qi(..) = Prob(Di < Dj) = Prob(D
2
i < D
2
j ) = Prob[(Yi − Yj)(Yi + Yj − 2k) < 0]. (7)
When k tends to infinity, (Yi − Yj)(Yi + Yj − 2k) < 0 occurs if and only if (Yi − Yj) > 0.
Hence, from (7), Qi(..) = Prob[(Yi − Yj)(Yi + Yj − 2k) < 0] converges to Prob(Yi − Yj >
0) = Pi(..) when k tends to infinity. To see that k-contracts are non-monotonic in own
performance, observe that for any Yj, the rewards to agent i is increasing up to the point
Yi = Yj, and then decreasing.
Remark 2 shows that standard tournament reward structure is a special case of k-
contracts; when k tends to infinity, a k-contract and a standard tournament, as studied in
the previous sections, are identical. However, for finite k, k-contracts diﬀer from standard
tournaments in that they give a higher reward to agents with performance in ’the middle’
than agents with a top performance.
To solve for equilibrium levels of risk and eﬀort under k-contracts, the following lemma,
which we believe is novel, will be very useful. First a standard definition.
Definition 2.1 (FOSD). Let Gi(d; ..) and Hi(d; ..) be cdf’s of Di. Gi(d; ..) first order
stochastic dominateHi(d; ..) if Gi(d; ..) ≥ Hi(d; ..) for all d, with Gi(d; ..) > Hi(d; ..) for
some d.
Let F (d; ηi) be the cdf of Di, as a function of ηi, holding µi and k constant at µˆi and
kˆ, respectively, where kˆ > µˆi. Furthermore, define η
∗
i = kˆ− µˆi. Now choose two values of
ηi, denoted η
1
i and η
2
i , where η
1
i < η
2
i . Then we have the following.
Lemma 1 F (d; η1i ) first order stochastic dominates F (d; η
2
i ), for η
∗
i ≤ η1i < η2i .
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 1 puts an upper bound on the risk taking of agent i in that any choice of
standard deviation ηi larger than η
∗
i generates a distribution of Di that is dominated.
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The intuition for Lemma 1 is that η∗i is the choice of standard deviation that maximizes
the probability of hitting very close to the benchmark k. If ηi is set larger than η
∗
i then
the distribution generated will perform worse with respect to the probability of hitting
very close to k, and the potential gains from an increased probability of hitting farther
from k does not oﬀset this eﬀect.
Corollary 1 Suppose σ > k. Then si = 0 is a (strictly) dominating choice for agent i.
Proof. First notice that regardless of ηi, it is dominated for agent i to choose µi > k.
Now fix µi at µˆi and k at kˆ, where µˆi ≤ kˆ, and recall that η∗i = kˆ − µˆi. By a simple
transformation, it follows that a choice of s2i larger than s
∗2
i is dominated, where s
∗2
i =
(kˆ − µˆi)2 − σ2 = (k2 − σ2) + µi(µi − 2k), which is negative for σ > k. It follows from
Lemma 1 that si = 0 is a dominating choice for agent i.
The corollary shows that σ > k is a suﬃcient condition for agents to choose si = 0 in
equilibrium.
Equipped with these results, we have the following.
Proposition 3 For a suﬃciently large σ, the first best provision of eﬀort is implementable
with a k-contract.
Proof. See the appendix.
Hence in contrast to the standard tournament scheme, k-contracts and individual
schemes are equivalent under risk neutrality: they both implement first best. The intuition
behind Proposition 3 is that to avoid excessive risk taking, and hence a low level of eﬀort,
the principal rewards the agent with output closest to a positive constant k rather than
rewarding the highest output. Reduced risk taking in turn makes it possible to give
incentives for eﬀort by increasing the prize spread, ∆W .
Let us make some comments. First, it is suﬃcient for Proposition 3 that the distri-
bution of the shocks has the FOSD property described in Lemma 1. In addition to the
normal, a simple distribution as the uniform also has this property. However, it is un-
known whether more general distributions have the FOSD property of Lemma 1, so in this
section we rely more on the normality assumption than in the previous section. Second,
since linear schemes can also implement first best in the case where agents choose both
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eﬀort and risk, it is not obvious why k-contracts should be preferred to linear schemes.
The downside with individual schemes compared to k-contracts, however, is that they
do not exploit commonality of the shocks, which may important e.g., in the market for
fund managers. Hence k-contracts can insure risk averse agents as well as linear schemes,
and provide stronger incentives. There exist examples with risk averse agents where k-
contracts dominate linear schemes, provided that agents are not too risk averse and that
the shocks are suﬃciently correlated.9
The empirical value of Proposition 3 is that it gives an explanation for the Mediocrity
Puzzle. If the rewards that accrue to an agent are such that moderately high relative out-
put is more highly rewarded than a very high relative output, that gives agents incentive
to choose a low level of risk, and hence gives incentives to work hard.
For example, a fund management company that wants to reward their fund managers
according to their relative output to e.g., insulate the managers against common risk
factors, may consider to give the highest reward to the manager with an output that
comes closest to some benchmark or index. In addition to insulating the managers against
common risk factors, such a scheme avoids giving incentives for excessive risk taking, which
a scheme rewarding the highest relative performance would. And, giving the managers
incentives for low levels of risk will in the next turn give them incentives to hard work on
their portfolio, e.g., in collecting and assessing financial data.
As indicated in the Introduction, there are many examples where informal reward
structures are non-monotonic; agents are encouraged to do not too well compared to a
peer group. For such cases, Proposition 3 can be interpreted as saying that a norm for
mediocrity, or more precisely a norm for a quite high performance - but not very high
- can be more beneficial to a group than a norm for excellence.10 Informal settings are
particularly interesting for our purposes because here the nature of the reward is often
such that the reward system is necessarily based on relative features. For example, as
9These examples have been obtained with numerical tecniques for utility functions with constant
absolute risk aversion.
10It is interesting to note that in his satiric description of the Norwegian society, ’The Laws of Jante’,
Aksel Sandemose, describes a society where excellence is strongly discouraged. For example, two of the
ten laws of Jante are ’Thou should not believe you are better than anyone else’, ’Thou should not believe
you are something’. Although the laws of Jante tend to focus on self-beliefs, rather than accomplishment,
it seems fair to say that they strongly discourage outlier accomplishments.
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emphasized by Frank (1985), social status is a positional good, in fixed supply, and hence
the status of an agent must be based on a comparison to other agents.
3 Conclusion
The moral of the paper is that in tournaments where risk taking is an option, the principal
gets what he does not pay for: rewarding a high relative performance yields a low levels
of eﬀort and expected output, while rewarding a ’mediocre’ relative performance yields
high levels of eﬀort.
We first showed that if a high reward in a group goes to the agent with the highest
output, this creates incentives for the agents in the group to take high risks. Although risk
taking is not necessarily harmful in itself, high risk taking is associated with low eﬀort,
which is harmful to expected production. Hence if the rewards to CEOs depends strongly
on how well its firm performs compared to other firms in an industry, e.g., through bonus
plans, in equilibrium the CEOs in the industry take high risks and put in low work eﬀort.
Given this argument, we find it natural that boards in real life are careful with putting
too much weight on relative factors in CEO compensation schemes.
Second, we show that if the highest reward in a group goes to an agent with a moder-
ately high output (’mediocre’), instead of to the agent with the highest output, the agents
in the group may be provided with an incentive to take a low level of risk and to work
hard. Hence a norm, or a formal contract, that approves very high relative performances
can be self-defeating, while a norm that approves of a ’mediocre’ relative performance
rather than a very high relative performances, can yield an eﬃcient outcome.
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5 Appendix A
Recall that output of agent i is given by Yi = µi + εi. In Proposition 1 and Proposition
2 it was shown that if εi is normally distributed, and agent i controls the variance of εi,
then in equilibrium agent i chooses to let the variance of εi be as high as possible, since
that minimizes g(0), and hence equilibrium eﬀort. In this appendix, we generalize these
results to a setting where εi is only required to be unimodal and symmetric. First notice
that the notion of second order stochastic dominance generalizes the notion of increased
variance from the normal case. We show that if the agent can choose to induce a second
order stochastically dominated distribution of εi, he will do so because such an operation
reduces g(0). In particular, we show that adding an iid (non-degenerate) εi will reduce
g(0), and hence equilibrium eﬀort. That generalizes Proposition 2. Moreover we show
that in the limit, when the agent adds infinitely many iid variables to εi, then g(0) tends
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to zero. That generalizes Proposition 1.
Suppose εi follows the density f(x), with full support. For simplicity, f(x) is assumed
to be diﬀerentiable. By symmetry, f(x) = f(−x), ∀x, and unimodality and symmetry
implies that f 0(−x) < 0, f 0(0) = 0, and f 0(x) < 0. Now construct the variable ε = εi+δi,
where εi and δi are iid, and denote the density of ε by h(y), with corresponding cdf H(y).
The purpose is to show that f (0) > h(0), from which it follows that equilibrium eﬀort
decreases when the agents add a stochastic variable to the noise terms.
First observe that,
H(y) =
Z ∞
−∞
Z y−z
−∞
f (x)f (z)dxdz (A1)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to y we get,
h(y) =
Z ∞
−∞
f(y − z)f (z)dz (A2)
Inserting for y = 0 into (A2) and by symmetry we get
h(0) =
Z ∞
−∞
f(−z)f(z)dz =
Z ∞
−∞
f(z)2dz (A3)
It remains to show that
R∞
−∞ f(z)
2dz < f (0). First observe that
R∞
−∞ f(z)
2dz = 2
R∞
0
f (z)2dz
by symmetry. Integrating by parts, we have that,Z ∞
0
f(z)2dz = −1
2
f(0)−
Z ∞
0
F (z)f(z)dz (A4)
Using this expression, we get that,
f (0)− h(0) = f(0) + f(0) + 2
Z ∞
0
F (z)f(z)dz (A5)
Hence f(0) − h(0) > 0 iﬀ f(0) > − R∞
0
F (z)f(z)dz. Substituting for F (z) = 1 − F (−z)
and integrating by part once more, we get that,Z ∞
0
F (z)f(z)dz = −f(0)−
Z ∞
0
F (−z)f(z)dz (A6)
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Simplifying, we get that, f(0)−(− R∞
0
F (z)f (z)dz) =
R∞
0
F (−z)f(z)dz < 0, since f 0(z) <
0 for z > 0. Hence f(0) > h(0), and we have shown that adding an iid random variable to
εi reduces equilibrium eﬀort. That generalizes Proposition 2. Furthermore, it can easily
be shown, and is hence skipped, that in the limit, as the number of added iid variables
goes to infinity, the density at zero goes to zero. That generalizes Proposition 1.
6 Appendix B
We start out with a remark establishing some distributional properties of the stochastic
variable Di, the distance between agent i’s output Yi and the benchmark k. Then Lemma
1 is proved, and finally Proposition 3. Throughout the appendix, subscripts are skipped
when possible.
Remark 3 D has cdf equal to F (d; ..) =
1√
π
R β
α
e−t
2
dt, where α =
√
2(µ−k−d)
2η
, and β =
√
2(µ−k+d)
2η
.
Proof. Recall that D = |k − Y |, where Y is normally distributed with mean k − µ
and variance η2. Hence the cdf of D equals,
F (d; ..) =
1p
2πη2
Z k+d
k−d
e
−
(d− µ)2
2η2 ∆d (B1)
where d ≥ 0. This is just the probability that a single realization of normally distributed
variable with expectation µ and variance η2 falls within a distance d of a benchmark k.
By standard procedures, the integral simplifies to,
F (d; ..) =
1√
π
Z β
α
e−t
2
dt, where α =
√
2(µ− k − d)
2η
, and β =
√
2(µ− k + d)
2η
(B2)
It is easily checked that F (d; ..) indeed induces a probability distribution, i.e., that
limd→∞ F (d; ..) = limd→∞
1√
π
R β
α
e−t
2
dt =
1√
π
R∞
−∞ e
−t2dt = 1. It can be noted that
since D2i is χ
2-distributed, Di is distributed as the square root of a χ2 variable.
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Diﬀerentiating F (d; ..) with respect to d, we obtain the density f (d; ..),
f(d; ..) =
∂F (d; ..)
∂d
=
e
−
(µ− k − d)2
2η2 + e
−
(µ− k + d)2
2η2p
2πη2
(B3)
Proof. of Lemma 1.
Recall that, by definition, η2 = σ2 + s2, and η∗ = kˆ − µˆ. We show that any choice of
η greater than η∗ is dominated in the sense of FOSD. Substitute µ = µˆ and k = kˆ into
F (d; ..) from Remark 1, substitute for η∗, and diﬀerentiate with respect to η, to obtain,
∂F (d; ..)
∂η
=
1√
2πη2
[(η∗ − d)e
−
(η∗ − d)2
2η2 − (η∗ + d)e
−
(η∗ + d)2
2η2 ] (B4)
We proceed to show that this expression is negative for η > η∗, and hence Lemma 1
follows. Denote the first term of the right side of (B4) by A1, and the second term by
A2. Moreover, substitute in η∗ +α for η, where α > 0. Hence A1 = (η∗− d)e
−
(η∗ − d)2
2(η∗ + α)2
and A2 = (η∗ + d)e
−
(η∗ + d)2
2(η∗ + α)2 . Since A2 > 0,
∂F (d; ..)
∂s
< 0 is equivalent to
A1
A2
< 1, for
d > 0. We finish the proof by showing that
A1
A2
< 1, for d > 0.
A1
A2
=
(η∗ − d)e
−
(η∗ − d)2
2(η∗ + α)2
(η∗ + d)e
−
(η∗ + d)2
2(η∗ + α)2
=
η∗ − d
η∗ + d
e
2dη∗
(η∗ + α)2 =
η∗ − d
η∗ + d
e
2dη∗
(η∗ + α)2 (B5)
Notice that from (B5) it follows that
A1
A2
= 1 when d = 0. We show that
A1
A2
< 1 for any
d > 0. Diﬀerentiating (B5) with respect to d yields,
∂(A1
A2
)
∂d
= −2e
2d
(η∗ + α)2 η∗(2η∗α+ α2 + d2)
(η∗ + d)2(η∗ + α)2
(B6)
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which is negative for d > 0. Hence
A1
A2
< 1, for d,α > 0, and consequently
∂F (d; ..)
∂η
< 0
for η > η∗, and d > 0, and Lemma 1 follows.
Proof. of Proposition 3.
Suppose σ is larger than the first best level of eﬀort, µ∗i . We show that this condition
is suﬃcient for first best to be implementable. First notice that, for a given k, to choose
eﬀort level µi larger than k is a dominated choice for agent i. Hence we can restrict
attention to µi ∈ [0, k], i = 1, 2. Moreover, choose k such that µ∗i < k < σ. Then, by
Corollary 1, si = 0 is a dominating strategy for agent i, and we can restrict attention to
solve for equilibrium in choice of eﬀort. The first order conditions are,
∂Ui
∂µi
=
∂Qi
∂µi
∆W − ∂Vi
∂µi
= 0, i = 1, 2. (B7)
The probability of agent i winning under a k-scheme, Qi(..), equals,
Qi =
Z ∞
0
Fi(d)fj(d)∆d
=
Z ∞
0
e
−
(µj − k − d)2
2σ2 + e
−
(µj − k + d)2
2σ2√
2πσ
[
1√
π
Z β
α
e−t
2
dt]∆d (B8)
Define erf(x) =
R x
−∞ e
−t2dt, and erfc(x) = 1 − erf(x). Diﬀerentiate (B8) by µ1 and
normalize by setting σ = 1 to obtain,
∂Q1
∂µ1 µ1<µ2
= − 1
2
√
π
{[(e14 (µ1+µ2−2k)2)(erf c(k − 1
2
µ1 −
1
2
µ2)− e
1
4
(µ1−µ2)2 +
e
1
4
(µ1−µ2)2(erf c(
1
2
µ1 −
1
2
µ2)]e
µ1+µ2−k− 12µ21− 12µ22} (B9)
while,
∂Q1
∂µ1 µ1>µ2
= − 1
2
√
π
{[(e14 (µ1+µ2−2k)2)(erf c(k − 1
2
µ1 −
1
2
µ2) + e
1
4
(µ1−µ2)2 −
e
1
4
(µ1−µ2)2(erf c(
1
2
µ1 −
1
2
µ2)]e
µ1+µ2−k− 12µ21− 12µ22} (B10)
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Substitute for µ1 = µ2 to obtain,
∂Qi
∂µi µi=µj
=
erf(k − µi)
2
√
π
(B11)
which is continuous and increasing in k. Therefore, since the cost of eﬀort V (µ∗i ) is
convex, the symmetric equilibrium is increasing in k. From equation (2) and equation
(B11) it is evident that the symmetric equilibrium is increasing (continuously) in ∆W ,
where equilibrium eﬀort equals k, in the limit, as ∆W tends to infinity. Hence for µ∗i < σ
and for any k such that µ∗i < k < σ, there exist a ∆W such that µ
∗
i is implemented in
Nash equilibrium.
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